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We consider the condition set out in section 69(1)(b) 
of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE 
1984) that reliance on computer evidence should be 
subject to proof of its correctness, and compare it to 
the 1997 Law Commission recommendation that a 
common law presumption be used that a computer 
operated correctly unless there is explicit evidence to 
the contrary (LC Presumption). We understand the LC 
Presumption prevails in current legal proceedings. We 
demonstrate that neither section 69(1)(b) of PACE 
1984 nor the LC presumption reflects the reality of 
general software-based system behaviour. 
The Law Commission proposals 
In Part XIII of Evidence in Criminal Proceedings: 
Hearsay and Related Topics,1 the Law Commission 
considered in 1997 the rationale behind section 69 of 
the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. Section 69 
of PACE 1984 stated, among other things: 
(1) In any proceedings, a statement in a 
document produced by a computer shall not 
be admissible as evidence of any fact stated 
therein unless it is shown – 
(a) that there are no reasonable 
grounds for believing that the 
statement is inaccurate because of 
improper use of the computer; 
(b) that at all material times the 
computer was operating properly, or 
if not, that any respect in which it was 
not operating properly or was out of 
operation was not such as to affect 
the production of the document or 
the accuracy of its contents; and ……... 
Condition (1)(b) was considered by the Law 
                                                          
1 The Law Commission, Evidence in Criminal Proceedings: 
Hearsay and Related Topics (1997), 
http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/app/uploads/2015/03/lc245_Legisl
ating_the_Criminal_Code_Evidence_in_Criminal_Proceedin
gs.pdf. 
Commission, accurately in our opinion, to be a 
significant imposition on those wishing to introduce 
evidence concerning computer operation, for two 
reasons. 
First, for any moderately complex software-based 
computer system, such as the IT transaction-
processing system Horizon used by Post Office 
Limited,2 it is a practical impossibility to develop such 
a system so that the correctness of every software 
operation is provable to the relevant standard in legal 
proceedings. Any such proofs3 require the use of 
mathematical-logical analysis methods (called formal 
methods) in the development of software. With the 
exception of certain computer-based OT4 systems 
involved in safety-critical operations, such as aircraft 
control systems, at the time the Law Commission was 
writing (1997), the use of formal methods to 
guarantee correctness was not common in general IT-
system software development. Nor is it so even today. 
Some of the authors have been involved for more 
than a decade in attempts to describe applicable, 
industrially mature formal methods in international 
standards for safety-critical OT systems. We can attest 
to the considerable resistance – even now – to any 
requirement for use of such methods, even in the 
development of such critical systems. 
It is clearly impractical for a requirement such as set 
out in section 69(1)(b) of PACE 1984 to expect 
evidence of a type that can only be obtained by using 
methods which the software industry generally has 
not used, and remains resistant to using, and which 
                                                          
2 Which has been the subject of recent legal proceedings, for 
which see Bates v the Post Office Ltd (No 6: Horizon Issues) 
[2019] EWHC 3408 (QB). 
3 It is important to note that attempts at such proofs might 
well not succeed, because the software is too complex for 
the proving technology. This is a standard difficulty with the 
application of such rigorous methods. 
4 “OT” stands for “operational technology”, similar to “IT” for 
“information technology”. Control systems run by digital 
computers are OT. The LC considers “documents produced 
by a computer”, e.g., in paragraph 13.4. This looks to us as if 
it refers primarily to IT, since OT generally does not produce 
documents, but rather produces actions. 
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might in any given case not necessarily succeed very 
well. There may well be a reason for a law requiring 
that critical systems be developed using such 
methods, and such a law could then render a 
requirement such as that of PACE section 69(1)(b) 
feasible. But that law must come first, and it is not 
there yet. 
Second, no matter the quality of the software, the 
computer hardware on which the software runs is 
necessarily constrained in the resources available to 
it. Hardware may, in the course of operations, be 
modified or constrained. By way of example, it may be 
exchanged or up-graded for other hardware, which 
may have different constraints on resources (such as 
size of memory or available disk space), or otherwise. 
These actions may cause the operations of even 
logically-impeccable software to act in such a way that 
they no longer fulfil their original intent; they may 
even behave unpredictably. This phenomenon is 
manifest in the increasing numbers of cybersecurity 
incidents, in which malware5 is inserted into running 
systems to subvert their operations. Stuxnet 
(considered below) and Triton are examples of 
malware deliberately inserted into OT systems, in this 
case industrial process control systems, to cause them 
to fail (successfully in both cases). There is not even a 
theoretical technical solution to this drawback that 
will lead to reliable practical countermeasures. 
The Law Commission wrote (original footnote 
omitted): 
13.3 … section 69 … must be examined against 
the requirement that the use of computer 
evidence should not be unnecessarily 
impeded, while giving due weight to the 
fallibility of computers. 
13.4 … section 69 … provides that a document 
produced by a computer may not be adduced 
as evidence of any fact stated in the 
document unless it is shown that the 
computer was properly operating and was not 
being improperly use … 
13.5 In essence, the party relying on 
computer evidence must first prove that the 
computer is reliable… This can be proved by 
                                                          
5 That is, malicious software inserted into a system contrary 
to the intent of the manufacturer of the system. Malware is 
most often software, more rarely hardware, as in the cases 
mentioned. But cases in which hardware is surreptitiously 
reconfigured are not unknown. 
tendering a written certificate, or by calling 
oral evidence … 
Here we note some technical terminology. In 
electrotechnical terms, “reliability” means “ability to 
perform as required, without failure, for a given time 
interval, under given conditions”.6 That is a notion of 
absolute perfection. However, as we shall note below, 
most software contains defects, at the rate (see our 
discussion below) of generally between 1 and 100 
defects per 1,000 lines of source code (LOC; 1,000 LOC 
is often referred to as 1 kLOC).7 The lower defect 
bound of around 1 per kLOC is generally attained only 
by carefully developed specialist safety-critical OT 
software, and not always. In general terms, none of us 
are aware of any non-trivial software-based system 
which can be shown to be reliable in the absolute 
sense given in the IEC definition. 
There is a branch of software engineering that 
estimates failure rates of software in operation, and 
attempts to draw conclusions about the properties of 
the software from an analysis of the statistics. This 
branch is known as “software reliability” or “software 
reliability engineering”.8 Software reliability does not 
deal in perfection (for, as we remarked, we do not 
know of any practical instance of perfection in non-
trivial software), but in estimating the chance of 
failure in operation, over a given time interval, to a 
given level of confidence (usually expressed either as 
a percentage or as a probability, equivalently). Such 
estimates are required, for example, by the UK 
Nuclear Regulator for assessing the performance of 
software-based emergency systems in UK nuclear 
power stations. 
It is not yet clear to us from any legal reasoning we 
have read, largely about chances of failure of software 
in specific ways (e.g, R v Seema Misra,9 and Bates v 
Post Office Ltd (No 6: Horizon Issues)10), how such 
                                                          
6 International Electrotechnical Vocabulary, definition 192-01-
24, available at 
http://www.electropedia.org/iev/iev.nsf/display?openform&iev
ref=192-01-24. 
7 The average reported by Humphrey (see below) was more, 
but very carefully constructed code achieved less. 
8 The prestigious International Symposium on Software 
Reliability Engineering (ISSRE) has been running for over 30 
years. 
9 T20090070, In the Crown Court at Guilford, Trial dates: 11, 
12, 13, 14, 15, 18, 19, 20, 21 October and 11 November 
2010, His Honour Judge N. A. Stewart and a jury, 12. Digital 
Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review (2015) 
Introduction, 44 – 55; Documents Supplement. 
10 [2019] EWHC 3408 (QB). 
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general estimates would be of use in legal 
proceedings. Estimates that a particular failure 
phenomenon will or will not manifest over a certain 
period of use requires reviewing the data from many 
hours of operation (typically over many years – even 
many hundreds of years when covering a collection of 
systems) as well as meticulous recording of failure, to 
a degree of rigour that is not found in most IT 
operations. We comment further on the 
phenomenology of software failure and its statistical 
foundations in the Appendix. 
The Law Commission cites Colin Tapper on IT-system 
error: 
13.7 … As Professor Tapper has pointed out, 
“most computer error is either immediately 
detectable or results from error in the data 
entered into the machine”.13 
13 C Tapper, “Discovery in Modern Times: A Voyage 
around the Common Law World” (1991) 67 Chicago-Kent 
Law Review 217, 248. 
Let us call the condition that a computer error “is 
immediately detectable or results from error in input 
data” the “Tapper Condition”. We were surprised to 
read Tapper’s suggestion that the Tapper Condition 
categorises “most computer error”, even allowing 
that he was writing in 1991. Reading the original 
paper, it seems to us as if Professor Tapper was not 
categorising “most computer error” in unqualified 
terms, but rather considering particular phenomena 
that are manifest in the use of one specific sort of IT 
system, namely systems commonly used for clerical 
work (maybe, more specifically, for legal-clerical 
work). The Tapper Condition does not appear to hold 
in general. 
For example, anyone who has used a spreadsheet 
program will be aware that many output errors result 
from incorrect calculations, and they are not 
immediately obvious.11 Given the pervasiveness of 
arithmetical error in spreadsheet programs, 
explicated by Powell and others, the question arises 
how people in fact use these programs in practice, 
given that they are unreliable. It is beyond the scope 
of this paper to pursue this line of thinking further. 
The “Pentium bug”,12 which was a fault in the design 
of the floating-point arithmetic processing in the Intel 
                                                          
11 Stephen G. Powell, Kenneth R. Baker and Barry Lawson, 
‘Impact of errors in operational spreadsheets’, Decision 
Support Systems 47(2):126-132, May 2009. 
12 This fault was in fact an error in hardware design, but 
came about in exactly the same way in which many software 
Pentium processor chip, manifestly did not satisfy the 
Tapper Condition. The bug was made public by 
Professor Nicely, a mathematics professor, a month 
after its maker knew of its existence. No one else 
using the CPU devices, of which there were very 
many, appears to have noticed inaccuracies in the 
output until Professor Nicely raised the issue.13 
Professor Nicely discovered the bug when he added a 
new Pentium processor to his set of computational 
devices performing number-theoretical research, and 
obtained some slightly different results when using 
the new processor. This was, in effect, a form of 
regression test. This is a pervasive and valued 
software assessment technique, in which, after an 
update to software, predefined tests which have been 
run on earlier versions of the software are repeated 
on the updated software to test whether exactly the 
same results ensue. Regression testing would be 
unnecessary if most bugs were overt and the Tapper 
Condition were to be valid. 
Instances of what is called “unintended acceleration” 
were reported in certain models of Toyota car. There 
is a software-based defect which could have caused 
instances of unintended acceleration, which 
manifestly did not satisfy the Tapper Condition.14 The 
existence of a bug which could cause the 
phenomenon was disputed for some years. It not only 
eluded discovery by the manufacturer, but also by a 
team of NASA specialists, who spent a number of 
person-years looking for one without success.15 A bug 
was then discovered by the software engineer 
Michael Barr when working as an expert witness. He 
used a testing technique known as “fault injection”. 
Barr claimed to have spent about three person-years 
discovering this bug. This demonstrates that such 
errors are not obvious – even to experts – and they do 
not satisfy the Tapper Condition.16 
Our final example contradicting the Tapper Condition 
                                                                                                  
bugs come about – through mistakes in the design of the 
component. 
13 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pentium_FDIV_bug. 
14 Michael Barr, Bookout v Toyota, 2005 Camry L4 software 
analysis. Slides presented to the court, 2015, available at 
https://www.safetyresearch.net/Library/BarrSlides_FINAL_S
CRUBBED.pdf. 
15 Michael Barr, ‘Firmware forensics: best practices in 
embedded software source code discovery’, 8 Digital 
Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review (2011) 148 – 
151. 
16 We understand the manufacturer continues to dispute 
whether the actual phenomenon that was discovered was in 
fact responsible for the unintended acceleration cases. 
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is R v Cahill; R v Pugh.17 Nurses were alleged to have 
falsified patient records in 2012, because of 
discrepancies found with computer records. The 
assumptions of the Tapper Condition led to a criminal 
trial, which collapsed three years later, when the 
cause of the discrepancies was admitted by a 
technician employed by the manufacturer of the IT 
system. Interestingly, this case revolved around a joint 
IT–OT system. The nurses used a handheld OT system, 
together with a complex back-office IT system 
recording their actions. That IT system was then 
corrupted, thus creating fallible evidence that had not 
been noticed was incorrect “immediately” in 
accordance with the Tapper Condition.18 
Other renowned defects manifestly do not satisfy the 
Tapper Condition. For instance, malware represents a 
form of error, in that a system subject to the 
execution of malware will generally not perform its 
intended function. The Stuxnet malware succeeded in 
destroying a number of centrifuges before the 
phenomenon was discovered and operation of the 
equipment halted.19 
In our opinion, inaccuracies in computer evidence are 
at least as likely to result from errors in the computer 
software as from errors in the data (including training 
data in the case of AI). Our examples above are 
intended to support this view, as well as show the 
limited applicability of the Tapper Condition. 
After noting various problems with a rigorous 
application of PACE 1984 section 69 in the light of the 
way in which IT systems were developed and 
monitored, as well as that some OT systems (for 
instance, an intoximeter) allow alternative methods of 
verifying the accuracy of their operation, the Law 
Commission proposed: 
13.13 … that section 69 of PACE be repealed 
without replacement.25 Without section 69, a 
common law presumption comes into play: 
In the absence of evidence to the 
contrary, the courts will presume that 
                                                          
17 14 October 2014 (Crown Court at Cardiff, T20141094 and 
T20141061 before HHJ Crowther QC). 
18 Harold Thimbleby, “Misunderstanding IT: Hospital 
cybersecurity and IT problems reach the courts,” Digital 
Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, 15:11–32, 
2018. DOI 10.14296/deeslr.v15i0.4891; Ruling by the Judge, 
14 Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review 
(2017) 67 – 71. DOI 10.14296/deeslr.v14i0.2541 
19 Ralph Langner, To Kill a Centrifuge, The Langner Group, 
November 2013, available from https://www.langner.com/to-
kill-a-centrifuge.  
mechanical instruments were in order 
at the material time.26 
25 Ibid. 
26 Phipson, para 23-14, approved by the Divisional Court 
in Castle v Cross [1984] 1 WLR 1372, 1377B, per Stephen 
Brown LJ. 
13.14 Where a party sought to rely on the 
presumption, it would not need to lead to 
evidence that the computer was working 
properly on the occasion in question unless 
there was evidence that it may not have been 
– in which case the party would have to prove 
that it was (beyond reasonable doubt in the 
case of the prosecution, and on the balance of 
probabilities in the case of the defence). The 
principle has been applied to such devices as 
speedometers27 and traffic lights,28 and in the 
consultation paper we saw no reason why it 
should not apply to computers. 
27 Nicholas v Penny [1950] 2 KB 466. 
28 Tingle Jacobs & Co v Kennedy [1964] 1 WLR 638n. 
There are, in fact, significant differences between 
various digital computer-based systems that render 
such a pervasive assumption questionable. The Law 
Commission cites relatively uncomplex OT systems 
such as speedometers, traffic lights, and intoximeters. 
Such systems can indeed mostly satisfy the Tapper 
Condition of overt, immediately recognisable failure, 
or indeed recognisable failure upon inspection, in 
contrast to the examples we have cited above that 
manifestly do not. 
We note that OT is manifestly not “computer 
evidence” as such, although system logs may 
constitute such evidence. Evidence is presumed to be 
information, and is therefore overtly IT. However, we 
note that the Law Commission introduces examples 
from OT when formulating its views on IT, including its 
view on the Tapper Condition – it mentions an 
intoximeter, traffic lights and speedometers, which 
are all OT. We consider these examples below. 
To understand how an intoximeter might satisfy the 
Tapper Condition, we note that there are physically 
independent ways to verify the results of an 
intoximeter application. A laboratory test for blood-
alcohol level is available; the subject may exhibit 
other, independent evidence of intoxication (some 
police forces ask a subject to walk along a narrow 
straight line); and so on. 
A second OT example is traffic lights. Traffic lights 
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appear to be fairly simple in terms of basic operation, 
but functioning devices certified for operation on 
roadways in most developed countries have complex 
and sophisticated failure-tolerance mechanisms built 
into them. These safety properties (such as not 
showing “proceed” simultaneously in two conflicting 
directions of travel) are implemented on the basis of 
previous (often unfortunate) experience. The failure-
tolerant mechanisms introduced for this purpose are 
generally validated by independent inspection 
agencies. Such rigour is not generally applied to, nor 
can it likely be practically applied in the same way to, 
such large IT systems as, say, the Post Office Horizon 
system. It is (still) an open question as to what 
software-based systems might rigorously satisfy the 
Tapper Condition. 
The Law Commission continues by discussing the 
response to their consultation proposal. It concludes: 
Our recommendation 
13.23 We are satisfied that section 69 serves 
no useful purpose. We are not aware of any 
difficulties encountered in those jurisdictions 
that have no equivalent. We are satisfied that 
the presumption of proper functioning would 
apply to computers, thus throwing an 
evidential burden on to the opposing party, 
but that that burden would be interpreted in 
such a way as to ensure that the presumption 
did not result in a conviction merely because 
the defence had failed to adduce evidence of 
malfunction which it was in no position to 
adduce. We believe, as did the vast majority 
of our respondents, that such a regime would 
work fairly. We recommend the repeal of 
section 69 of PACE.45 (Recommendation 50) 
45 See cl 19 of the draft Bill. 
Section 69 of PACE 1984 was repealed by section 60 
of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999. 
Since then, the presumption mentioned by the Law 
Commission in its recommendation 13.23 (what we 
have called the LC Presumption) has prevailed as a 
rule of evidence. 
Our discussion above indicates that we do not 
consider that the LC Presumption appropriately 
considers the actual behaviour of all software-based 
systems, at least in the current or foreseeable state of 
engineering development. We have indicated that 
certain superficially-simple OT systems based on 
digital computer hardware and software, such as 
traffic lights, speedometers and intoximeters may 
satisfy the Tapper Condition and therefore justify the 
LC Presumption. However, such systems are usually 
based on validation and certification regimes that are 
completely different from the current techniques 
used in the development of large software-based IT 
systems, such as the Post Office Horizon system. Even 
much simpler IT systems are remarkably hard to verify 
and validate. 
It is well to consider the quality of software in general. 
The facts are, in our opinion, not encouraging. We 
now review some of them. 
The quality of software  
The quality of software is traditionally taken in 
software engineering to be correlated with the 
density of (discovered) defects.20 
First, we provide some definitions. A defect is, 
according to the influential definition used at Carnegie 
Mellon’s Software Engineering Institute, “any flaw or 
imperfection in a software work product or software 
process”, in which by software work product is meant 
any artefact created as part of the software process, 
which itself is “a set of activities, methods, practices, 
and transformations that people use to develop and 
maintain software work products”.21 
The reader will recall we explained 1 kLOC as 1,000 
lines of code; here we need to be a little more precise. 
In the numbers we cite below, we consider lines of 
executable source code, 1 kLOC represents a very 
small program. The term “executable” means that 
lines of pure commentary are not included in the 
count. Commentary occurs regularly in well-written 
source code as a means of leading an inspector 
through its intended operation. “Source code” here 
generally means programs written in imperative 
languages such as C, Ada, Java, and Python. Such 
imperative languages are by far the most common 
type of language used for programming IT systems. 
Such source code is transformed by automated formal 
linguistic processes (compiling, and linking) into code 
which can be read and executed directly by a 
                                                          
20 Yet another term for “something wrong”. We introduce it 
here because it is used by the literature we discuss 
immediately below. 
21 Brad Clarke and Dave Zubrow, How Good is the Software: 
A Review of Defect Prediction Techniques, Carnegie-Mellon 
University Software Engineering Institute presentation, 2001, 
available from 
https://resources.sei.cmu.edu/asset_files/Presentation/2002_
017_001_22912.pdf. 
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computer. 
Defects can arise in a number of ways in this process 
of writing source code in a higher-level language and 
translating. They may occur in the source code itself, 
or be introduced by the largely-automated processes 
of implementation, and lastly by the computer 
hardware not quite executing the machine code the 
way its designers intended or expected. Examples of 
all of these phenomena are known to well-informed 
software engineers. We consider here exclusively 
defects in source code. 
We now consider what defect numbers look like in 
terms of kLOC. For the sake of simplicity, we only 
consider defects in source code, ignoring other 
sources of errors. 
Humphrey considered data derived from more than 
8,000 programs written by industrial software 
developers.22 He wrote, “We now know how many 
defects experienced software developers inject. On 
average, they inject a defect about every ten lines of 
code.” The average number of defects per kLOC was 
about 120. The best 20% of programmers managed 62 
defects per kLOC; the best 20%, 29 defects per kLOC. 
Even the top 1% still injected 11 defects per kLOC.23 
Typical OT and IT software has many kLOCs, even 
thousands of kLOCs, and hence very many defects. 
The evidence implies that all software can be 
considered to have multiple faults. 
McDermid and Kelly reported on the defect densities 
in safety-critical industrial software:24 
“There is a general consensus in some areas of 
the safety critical systems community that a 
fault density of about 1 per kLoC is world 
class. Some software … is rather better but 
fault densities of lower than 0.1 per kLoC are 
exceptional. The UK [Ministry of Defence] 
funded the retrospective static analysis of the 
[Hercules] C130J [transport aircraft] software, 
previously developed to [civilian aerospace 
                                                          
22 Watts S. Humphrey, ‘The Watts New? Collection: Columns 
by the SEI’s Watts Humphrey’, Special Report CMU/SEI-
2009-SR-024. Software Engineering Institute, Carnegie-
Mellon University, November 2009, available at 
https://resources.sei.cmu.edu/asset_files/SpecialReport/200
9_003_001_15035.pdf. 
23 ‘The Watts New? Collection: Columns by the SEI’s Watts 
Humphrey’, p 132. 
24 John McDermid and Tim Kelly, Software in Safety-Critical 
Systems: Achievement and Prediction, Nuclear Future 
02(03), 2006, 3.1. Preliminary version is available at 
https://www-users.cs.york.ac.uk/tpk/inuce2004.pdf. 
software standard RTCA] DO-178B, and 
determined that it contained about 1.4 safety-
critical faults per kLoC (the overall flaw 
density was around 23 per kLoC…whilst a fault 
density of 1 per kLoC may seem high it is 
worth noting that commercial software is 
around 30 faults per kLoC, with initial fault 
injection rates of over 100 per kLoC.” 
Consider that “safety-critical faults” means faults 
whose possible consequences include system failures 
causing damage (injuries or death and/or damage to 
the environment). German and Mooney25 and 
German26 report the C130J static analysis to which 
McDermid and Kelly refer. Also see the somewhat 
different view of Daniels.27 Ladkin lists the specific 
software defects identified during this static analysis, 
which were communicated to one of the authors.28 
Jackson, Thomas and Millett reference a plethora of 
incidents and dependability problems.29 
Such defect densities are not inevitable. For example, 
a company founded by one of the authors, Praxis, 
now part of Altran UK Limited, develops software 
using a program development environment named 
SPARK,30 which makes extensive use of formal 
methods. Chapman reports general defect densities of 
around 1 per 25 kLOC in delivered software developed 
                                                          
25 Andy German and Gavin Mooney, 2001. Air Vehicle 
Software Static Code Analysis – Lessons Learnt, in Felix 
Redmill and Tom Anderson (eds.), Aspects of Safety 
Management, Proceedings of the Ninth Safety-critical 
Systems Symposium, Springer-Verlag London. 
26 German, Andy 2003. Software Static Code Analysis 
Lessons Learned. Crosstalk 16(11), The Journal of Defence 
Software Engineering, November 2003, available from 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.63
8.6456&rep=rep1&type=pdf. 
27 Daniels, Dewi, 2019 Email Contributions concerning the 
UK MoD C130J software inspection, sent to the System 
Safety List, 2019-11-14 and 2019-11-17, available at 
http://www.systemsafetylist.org/2019-
November/005033.html, 
http://www.systemsafetylist.org/2019-November/005044.html 
and http://www.systemsafetylist.org/2019-
November/005045.html 
28 Peter Bernard Ladkin, 2011. Dependable Software: A 
View. Slides for a keynote talk at the 2011 Ada Connection 
conference, Edinburgh UK. Available from https://rvs-
bi.de/publications/Talks/AdaConn2011TalkLadkin.pdf. 
29 Daniel Jackson, Martyn Thomas and Lynette I. Millett 
(eds.), 2007. Software for Dependable Systems: Sufficient 
Evidence? Report of the Committee on Certifiably 
Dependent Software Systems, (U.S.) National Research 
Council. National Academies Press. Available from 
https://www.nap.edu/catalog/11923/software-for-
dependable-systems-sufficient-evidence#toc. 
30 John Barnes, SPARK: The proven approach to high-
integrity software (Altran Praxis, 2012). 
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using SPARK. This is one to two orders of magnitude 
better than the C130J software considered above.31 
However, as we have noted above, many software 
developers still eschew thorough use of such formal 
methods as used at Praxis and Altran UK Limited. In 
our view this is because the use of formal methods 
requires a level of mathematical and logical 
understanding that many professional programmers 
typically still do not possess. In addition, training and 
experience in the use of such methods constitutes a 
cost that most companies are not necessarily willing 
to pay unless they are required to do so by 
contractual or regulatory obligation. 
There are exceptions. The current international 
standard for the functional safety of software is IEC 
61508-3:2010.32 This standard, as well as its 
predecessor from 1997, classifies “formal methods” as 
“Highly Recommended” for the highest-dependability 
categories of software-implemented safety function 
(those needing a “Systematic Capability” SC4, and 
sometimes also for the next-lower category SC3). It 
does not amplify, however, on which methods might 
be meant, or which use of them would be helpful or 
appropriate. 
In an area of rapidly increasing importance for 
software, the quality of software is generally taken by 
cybersecurity professionals to be connected to its 
cybersecurity vulnerability. This is shown in, for 
example, the training materials of the SANS 
Institute.33 We note that the list of vulnerabilities in 
Tables C1 to C7 of the NIST guidance on ICS 
cybersecurity34 look remarkably like lists of software 
defects. While this may be so, we note that not every 
                                                          
31 Roderick Chapman, Slides 43-48 of presentation 
Correctness by Construction: The Case for Constructive 
Static Verification, 2005, available at. 
https://samate.nist.gov/SSATTM_Content/papers/Correctnes
s%20by%20Construction%20-%20Chapman.pdf. 
32 International Electrotechnical Commission, IEC 61508 
Functional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable 
electronic safety-related systems – Part 3: Software 
requirements, Edition 2, 2010. 
33 By way of example, see Evelyn Labbate, Vulnerability as a 
Function of Software Quality. Global Information Assurance 
Certification Paper, version of 2018-03-18. SANS Institute. 
Available at 
https://www.giac.org/paper/gsec/647/vulnerability-function-
software-quality/101493. 
34 Keith Stouffer, Suzanne Lightman, Victoria Pillitteri, 
Marshall Abrams and Adam Hahn, 2015. Special Publication 
800-82, Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security, 
Revision 2. U.S. National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, May 2015. Available from 
https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-82/rev-2/final. 
software defect results in a cybersecurity 
vulnerability, and not every cybersecurity vulnerability 
arises from a software defect. 
A “Third Way” between PACE 1984 and 
the LC Presumption  
Computers are indeed fallible, as the Law Commission 
recognised (paragraph 13.3). Any IT system of 
practical size will have displayed faults many times 
since it was first put into service. Most IT systems will 
have had very many faults corrected through 
“patches” or new releases of software. No 
programmer could credibly claim that they know that 
they have corrected the last fault in their software.35 
We suggest that no competent programmer would 
even make such a claim. 
From the discussion above, it is our view that a court 
should start with the presumption that any software 
system contains or is influenced by errors that make it 
fallible. It will therefore fail from time to time when a 
combination of circumstances lead to an erroneous 
path of execution through the software – and such 
failures may not be obvious, and may even be 
perverse. In assessing the weight to be placed on 
specific computer evidence, it follows from this that 
the trier of fact should ask “how likely is it that this 
particular evidence has been affected in a material 
way by computer error?” 
Providing an answer to this question involves, first, 
reviewing any available evidence for the number, 
frequency and nature of errors that have been 
reported in the particular system previously. 
Relevant evidence should normally be readily 
available. Any professional software support team will 
of necessity maintain a database or log of errors that 
have been reported, investigated and perhaps 
corrected. There is likely to be a “known error log” 
and records of earlier fixes. There may be lists of 
corrected errors, and lists of errors that remain to be 
corrected. These will be summarized in release 
notices that accompany technical fixes (“patches”) or 
new releases of software components. Further details 
may exist in project reports and email exchanges. If 
the software team works to professional project-
management standards, these should define what 
records are kept and what information is available, 
and how it has been audited. We note that, with the 
                                                          
35 See, for example, the discussion of the work of Adams 
and others in the Appendix. 
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rise in concerns about cybersecurity, such record-
keeping is mandated by IT security standards. 
Maintaining logs of system events, for example, is 
part of an Information Security Management System 
(ISMS), as required by ISO/IEC 27001:201336 (Annex A 
12.4). 
In Bates v Post Office Ltd (No 6: Horizon Issues),37 the 
company Fujitsu, which was responsible for the IT 
system Horizon, maintained a Known Error Log (KEL), 
and maintained records of reported potential 
anomalies and follow-up action, including remedial 
measures by way of records known as PEAKs.38 This 
enabled Fraser J and the expert witnesses to 
categorise known Horizon system defects. As a result, 
Fraser J was able to arrive at a judgement concerning 
whether the claimants might be right that anomalies 
in the Horizon system, and not their own 
malfeasance, caused the problems they were accused 
of by the Post Office. 
Second, we suggest a court should consider the nature 
of the specific evidence. Specifically, could the 
evidence be materially changed by computer error? 
For example, suppose evidence were to be presented 
in the form of a coherent and lengthy chain of emails 
nominally between participants. It would be hard to 
propose a credible computer error that could create 
such a lengthy email chain of any complexity that 
retained coherence. In contrast, consider a single 
calculated numerical value in a spreadsheet adduced 
as evidence. It is easy to see how such a calculated 
numeric value could be incorrect because of an 
erroneous algorithm underlying the spreadsheet 
calculations; indeed, many such errors are commonly 
                                                          
36 International Organization for Standardization/International 
Electrotechnical Commission, ISO/IEC 27001 Information 
technology -- Security techniques -- Information security 
management systems – Requirements, ISO and IEC, 2013. 
37 [2019] EWHC 3408 (QB). 
38 Fraser J at [621] ‘The experts agreed the following about 
PEAKs and their content. “PEAKs record a timeline of 
activities to fix a bug or a problem. They sometimes contain 
information not found in KELs about specific impact on 
branches or root causes – what needs to be fixed. They are 
written, by people who know Horizon very well. They do not 
contain design detail for any change. They are generally 
about development activities and timeline rather than about 
potential impact. PEAKs typically stop when development 
has done its job, so they are not likely to contain information 
about follow-on activities, such as compensating branches 
for any losses.” It is also agreed, and indeed can be seen 
from the actual PEAKs themselves, that some of them record 
observations of financial impact.’ 
encountered.39 
Third, there is the question whether an IT system 
complies (and, if so, to what level of conformance) 
with any relevant standards to the application that it 
nominally serves. For instance, consider the 
bookkeeping system in relation to Bates v Post Office 
Ltd (No 6: Horizon Issues).40 It is a requirement for 
commercial bookkeeping to record all transactions. Its 
is also important not to record transactions that do 
not occur. It would follow that an IT system that 
performs commercial bookkeeping functions should 
adhere to these requirements, amongst others. 
However, it seems that Horizon did not: Fraser J noted 
a phenomenon listed as “Phantom Transactions”. (See 
number 15 in his list of 29 bugs exhibited by Horizon 
and known to Fujitsu in Appendix 2 to his judgment.) 
An IT system which serves a commercial application, 
but which does not adhere to standard requirements 
within that application, can be regarded as generally 
less dependable than systems which do so adhere, 
and a court can legitimately make such an inference. 
An exception to this inference may occur when the IT 
system is accompanied by appropriate documentation 
and evidence that explicitly lists the application 
requirements the system does and does not address; 
and that this documentation is in fact correct. It is 
presumed that the users are aware of this 
documentation, its contents and implications. 
Implications for the LC Presumption  
We have considered the requirement of PACE 1984 
section 69, the 1997 Law Commission review of 
computer evidence which considered the repeal of 
the section, the deliberations of that review, including 
the Tapper Condition and various phenomena of IT 
and OT, including the discussion of a number of 
relevant examples. We conclude that neither section 
69(i)(b) of PACE 1984 nor the LC Presumption reflects 
the reality of general software-based system 
behaviour. 
In the Appendix, we provide a technical account of the 
mathematical and statistical models, together with 
some empirical and experimental results that support 
the current understanding of software failure 
processes within the software engineering 
community. In particular, we consider how this 
                                                          
39 Stephen G. Powell, Kenneth R. Baker and Barry Lawson, 
‘Impact of errors in operational spreadsheets’, Decision 
Support Systems 47(2):126-132, May 2009. 
40 [2019] EWHC 3408 (QB). 
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understanding allows us to reach a number of 
conclusions about the inappropriateness of the 
statement by the Law Commission at 13.23: “We are 
satisfied that the assumption of proper functioning 
would apply to computers…” 
This statement seems to us to come close to asserting 
that it should be assumed that a software fault is not 
the cause when some untoward event has occurred, 
unless there is overt evidence of such a fault. 
Ironically, a poorly engineered system, which is likely 
to suffer from the effects of bugs, may also be unlikely 
to record reliable evidence of its own behaviour. 
In the particular case of evidence about the reliability 
of IT and non-trivial OT, there are three issues, based 
on the current state of knowledge of software 
engineering, upon which we regard it as necessary 
that a court form a view when considering computer 
evidence. The points noted below are more fully 
elaborated upon in the Appendix: 
(1) A presumption that any particular 
computer system failure is not caused by 
software is not justified, even for software 
that has previously been shown to be very 
reliable. 
(2) Evidence of previous computer failure 
undermines a presumption of current proper 
functioning. 
(3) The fact that a class of failures has not 
happened before is not a reason for assuming 
it cannot occur. 
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Appendix 
A general account of the software failure 
process, and its consequences for the LC 
Presumption 
In this appendix we provide support for our three 
concluding bullet points (for which see below) 
concerning the LC Presumption. We do this by first 
discussing the nature of software faults and failures. 
We then describe two widely accepted mathematical 
models of the software failure process. We go on to 
describe briefly some quantitative evidence about 
software faults and failures, obtained from experience 
of widespread operational experience of large 
software systems, and from some innovative 
experiments. We then use this chain of model and 
evidence to support our critique of the LC 
Presumption. 
We begin with some terminology. A software fault41 is 
something “not right” in the software. It is the result 
of some erroneous action during the creation of the 
software, or perhaps at some later stage, for instance 
when an attempt to fix a fault results in the 
introduction of a new one. Such erroneous action can 
be human error, for example a programmer error, or, 
when software is automatically generated from 
higher-level functional descriptions, as is increasingly 
common, an error in the generation process. 
Software in the form of source code can be regarded 
as “pure design” since it has no physical manifestation, 
unlike hardware. Software faults are the result of 
errors in design. Software faults are static: they are a 
permanent characteristic of software until they are 
corrected. Unlike hardware, software does not 
“break”; it does not suddenly start behaving 
differently without anything else having changed, as a 
chip does if transistors burn out. Note that software 
faults can be either errors of commission – something 
that is done that is “wrong” – or errors of omission – 
something not done that should have been done. 
A software failure is an event in which the software 
does not exhibit the expected or intended behaviour 
or yield the expected or intended output. Suppose the 
                                                          
41 “Fault” is also called “bug” (e.g., Fraser J in Bates v Post 
Office Ltd (No 6: Horizon Issues) [2019] EWHC 3408 (QB)) 
and “defect” (e.g., in the Humphrey documents from the 
Software Engineering Institute of Carnegie Mellon 
University), as well as “error” (e.g., the Law Commission 
review). We standardise here on “fault”. 
software under consideration has a fault. Then, given 
certain input data to the software in a particular 
operational environment, the fault may become 
manifest, in that it causes a failure of the software. 
Suppose a failure has occurred and has been 
observed. There usually follows a search for the fault 
that caused it. The fault can be considered initially as 
the sum total of characteristics of the software that 
contributed to causing the failure. Not all of those 
characteristics will necessarily be erroneous; some of 
them might well be characteristics one wants to 
retain. But some feature in that sum total will have to 
be changed if we do not want the failure to recur. 
Usually, the feature or features chosen to be changed 
are regarded as the kernel “fault”. 
There are two usual models – mathematized 
conceptions – of software operational failures: one for 
discrete events and a second for continuous 
operation. An example of a discrete-demand system is 
the protection system of a nuclear reactor, which is 
called upon to shut down the reactor and keep it safe 
if the reactor gets into a hazardous state. Such a 
system is only called upon to act, generally rather 
infrequently, when a hazardous state is entered. That 
call is known as a demand, an event taken to occur at 
a discrete point in time. Failure to act upon such a 
demand is a potentially serious event for a safety-
critical system, such as a reactor protection system. 
Many commercial IT systems are also demand-based, 
for example, the transaction-processing part of the 
Horizon system, considered in Bates v Post Office Ltd 
(No 6: Horizon Issues),42 R v Seema Misra43 and the 
earlier case of Post Office Ltd v Castleton.44 Here, an 
interaction of a subpostmaster with the system is a 
demand, and each interaction can be correctly 
handled by the system, or the system can fail in some 
way. If we are looking just at failure behaviour, we are 
not concerned with the mathematical details of the 
transaction, but only in whether the outcome was 
success (a successful transaction) or failure (something 
went wrong). 
Examples of continuously operating systems are 
common in engineering when a physical system is 
under computer control. An example is a fly-by-wire 
                                                          
42 [2019] EWHC 3408 (QB). 
43 T20090070, In the Crown Court at Guilford, Trial dates: 
11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 18, 19, 20, 21 October and 11 November 
2010, His Honour Judge N. A. Stewart and a jury, 12 Digital 
Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review (2015) 
Introduction, 44 – 55; Documents Supplement. 
44 [2007] EWHC 5 (QB). 
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aircraft control system. Such a system consists 
(crudely) of a computer interposed between the 
cockpit controls operated by the pilots and the 
aerodynamic control surfaces of the aircraft: the pilots 
manipulate their controls; the manipulations are 
sensed by electronic devices called sensors and 
communicated to the flight-control computer; the 
flight-control computer processes these sensor values 
as input, calculates what has to happen with the 
aerodynamic control surfaces to achieve the intended 
command, and then issues detailed commands to the 
control-surface actuators to move the control surfaces 
to get that to happen. A failure occurring in that 
control-logic chain is an event that could, in principle, 
occur at any time and may endanger the safety of the 
aircraft. An example is where the aircraft is near the 
ground, and the pilots issue a “climb” command by 
pulling back on the control stick/column, but the 
flight-control computer issues “nose down”/“descend” 
commands to the elevator actuators. 
In each of these processes, whether discrete-demand 
or continuous operation, the failures occur in effect 
randomly from the point of view of the system logic: 
they arise through inputs to the processes combined 
with features of the system environment (the relevant 
parts of the world in which the system sits). The inputs 
to the processes are generally not predictable to the 
system (otherwise the values would not need to be 
input), and the features of the system environment 
are also just happenstance as far as the system is 
concerned. 
In statistics, phenomena that occur randomly in time 
are said to form a stochastic process. The reason 
failures are considered to be random is that, as 
indicated above, the environment is not under the 
control of the system (it can be too hot, too cold, too 
damp or wet, too full of ionising radiation, and so on), 
and one cannot generally say in advance when 
demands or commands will occur and what they will 
be. Hence, crucially, it cannot be predicted with 
certainty from the logic of the system when failures 
will occur. This means that we are in the realm of 
probability if we wish to answer questions such as 
“how reliable is this system?” 
Quite simple probability models can be used to 
address such questions. In the case of a demand-
based system, the random sequence of failures is 
construed to follow a Bernoulli Process. A measure of 
reliability here is probability of failure on demand 
(pfd). In the case of continuously operating systems, 
an appropriate model is a Poisson Process. Here a 
measure of reliability is failure rate. 
We illustrate how these models look by providing the 
mathematical definition of a Bernoulli process. First, 
we need a few more definitions. A random variable is 
a quantity that acquires a value during the operation 
of a stochastic process. We have noted above what 
values are appropriate for describing the failure 
process of a discrete-demand system, namely success 
and failure. So a specific demand is represented by a 
random variable, and the value of that variable 
reflects how the demand turns out. This is called a 
Bernoulli trial. Two trials are said to be (stochastically) 
independent if the probability of a particular value of 
one trial is completely unaffected by an observed 
value of the other. 
Mathematically, a Bernoulli process is a sequence of 
Bernoulli trials, that is, a finite or infinite sequence of 
independent random variables X1, X2, X3, ..., such that 
o for each i the value of Xi is either 1 (standing 
for failure) or 0 (for success); 
o for all values of i, the probability p that Xi = 1 
is the same. 
An individual random variable Xi here is a Bernoulli 
trial. Two Bernoulli trials are called identically 
distributed if they have the same p. A Bernoulli 
process is thus a sequence of independent identically-
distributed Bernoulli trials. 
Independence here is crucial. It can be shown that, if 
the probability p is known, past outcomes of previous 
trials provide no information about the outcomes of 
any trials in the future. (If p is unknown, however, the 
past does inform indirectly about the future, in that an 
observer will be trying to judge the likely value of p 
through statistical inference from the trials they have 
observed in the past) With the interpretation of the 
value of Xi  as success or failure, the parameter p is a 
measure of the reliability of the underlying system 
which the Bernoulli process is characterising. 
For continuously operating systems, failures occur in a 
Poisson process, which can be seen as the continuous-
time equivalent of the discrete-time Bernoulli process. 
The parameter of this process – the equivalent of p in 
the Bernoulli process – is the rate of occurrence of 
failures, often denoted λ, which is a measure of a 
continuously-operating system’s reliability. Poisson 
processes share with Bernoulli processes the 
characteristic that the history of past failures and their 
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timing does not affect the probabilities associated 
with future events, so long as λ is known. 
This business of independence of past and future, in 
both the Bernoulli and Poisson processes, is a 
mathematical property. Whether it applies to a real 
system, at least to a close approximation, would need 
to be checked. 
Further details and mathematical properties of these 
processes can be found in textbooks on stochastic 
processes, and in many locations on the Web.45 
It is worth noting – but is beyond the scope of this 
article to demonstrate – that the Poisson process can, 
under appropriate circumstances, be used as an 
approximation to the Bernoulli process. In the case of 
the Horizon system considered in Bates v Post Office 
Ltd (No 6: Horizon Issues)46, R v Seema Misra47 and 
Post Office Ltd v Castleton,48 one could treat the 
failure events as if they occurred in calendar time as a 
Poisson process, thus approximating to the Bernoulli 
process in which they occur in terms of counts of sub-
postmaster demands. However, certain phenomena 
such as “phantom transactions”, considered at [287] – 
[295] of the Technical Appendix to Judgement (No. 6) 
in Bates v Post Office Ltd (No 6: Horizon Issues),49 do 
not occur as a result of real demands (hence the word 
“phantom” used by Fraser J), but are seemingly-
random events occurring in a continuously-running 
system. These are better modelled using Poisson 
processes. 
A major technical concern is the relationship between 
faults and failures. How do faults in software affect its 
reliability? Common sense might suggest to us that, all 
things being equal, fewer faults generally result in 
higher system reliability – in terms of the Bernoulli 
process, there is a smaller probability of failure on 
demand. We might also think that some faults are 
“larger” than others, and therefore have a greater 
deleterious effect upon reliability than “small” faults. 
So, for a demand-based system, we can consider the 
                                                          
45 For example, Kyle Siegrist, Random, Chapter 10: Bernoulli 
Trials, available at 
https://www.randomservices.org/random/bernoulli/index.html 
, and Chapter 13: The Poisson Process, available at 
https://www.randomservices.org/random/poisson/index.html 
46 [2019] EWHC 3408 (QB). 
47 T20090070, In the Crown Court at Guilford, Trial dates: 
11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 18, 19, 20, 21 October and 11 November 
2010, His Honour Judge N. A. Stewart and a jury, 12 Digital 
Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review (2015) 
Introduction, 44 – 55; Documents Supplement. 
48 [2007] EWHC 5 (QB). 
49 [2019] EWHC 3408 (QB). 
size of a fault to be the probability that the fault will 
cause a system failure on a randomly-selected 
demand. For a continuously operating system the size 
of a fault is the rate at which it would cause a failure – 
in a Poisson process – during operation of the system. 
Some of the issues in the relationship between faults 
and failures that have been addressed in the software-
engineering literature are relevant to our critique of 
the LC Presumption. We described some of this work 
below, and its relevance to legal evidence. 
A seminal early paper by Adams50 used a world-wide 
database of software faults in many thousands of 
large IBM computer systems to investigate the 
variation in their sizes. The study involved thousands 
of computers around the world, with tens of 
thousands of years of combined operational exposure. 
For each fault, the duration of its exposure, and the 
number of times it manifested itself during that time, 
allowed Adams to estimate its size (the rate of the 
Poisson process associated with that fault). 
Adams’ results were surprising to the software-
engineering community of the time. It turned out that 
fault sizes varied enormously: the largest occurred 
many orders of magnitude more frequently than the 
smallest. Furthermore, the smallest faults were 
extremely small. 
Adams looked at two classes of software. One was a 
single software product in three different “releases” 
(versions). He divided the faults into 8 classes, ranging 
from those which manifested in failure on average 
every 30 months of operation, up to faults which 
manifested in failure on average once in every 95,000 
months of operation – a little over 7,900 years. He was 
able to obtain data on faults which only manifest in 
nearly 8,000 years of operation because the software 
was running in many, many places. The significant 
observation is that the faults he identified in this rare-
manifestation class were between a fifth and a 
quarter of all faults. 
In the second class, Adams looked at nine different 
IBM software products. Here, the rarest manifestation 
class was once in 60,000 months, that is, once in 5,000 
years. The 9 products were uniform in so far that, for 
each product, approximately one third of all the bugs 
which manifested were in this once-in-5,000-year 
class. That is, for one third of the faults in the software 
                                                          
50 Edward N. Adams, ‘Optimizing preventive service of 
software products’, IBM J. of Research and Development 
28(1): 2-14, 1984. 
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manifested in his study across these nine different 
products, each led to failures on average every 5,000 
years or longer. 
The results from the general fault-failure model used 
by Adams were validated in other empirical studies. 
NASA had been funding extensive theoretical and 
experimental studies in software engineering to 
support their quest for high reliability in deep-space 
exploration. Under this programme, some ingenious 
experiments were conducted on some scientific and 
engineering programs, albeit smaller than those 
studied by Adams, to measure the sizes of their 
faults.51 These experiments, and later ones,52 
produced very similar results to those of Adams 
concerning extremely large variation in fault sizes. 
These data, of course, are several decades old, and 
computer technology of all kinds has progressed in 
that time. For example, Adams’ “most-frequent” 
category of failure was once-in-30-months; today one 
could be reasonably confident to detect all such bugs 
in pre-release testing by running the software on 
1,000 inexpensive desktop computers for a day. Such a 
scenario seems entirely feasible for a software 
company. Indeed, it may well be that all categories up 
to Adams’s “least frequent” can be detected today by 
suitable “test farms” and therefore corrected before 
market release. 
But that still leaves the problem of the remaining 
faults, ones that manifest very infrequently. It is not 
possible to be certain that there are not very many of 
these, particularly in large and complex software 
systems. The exact numbers may have changed 
somewhat since the studies were carried out, but we 
see no reason to think that the qualitative 
phenomenology of software faults and failures as 
identified by Adams and others has changed 
significantly, and our collective experience supports 
this view. 
The model Adams used, that individual faults on 
continuously-operating software manifest in failures 
                                                          
51 Phyllis M. Nagel and James A. Skrivan, Software 
reliability: repetitive run experimentation and modelling, 
Boeing Computer Services Company, NASA-CR-165836, 
February 1982, available at 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/198200
13026.pdf. 
52 Janet R. Dunham and John L. Pierce, An experiment in 
software reliability, NASA Langley, NASA-CR-172553, May 
1986, available at 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/198600
20075.pdf. 
as a Poisson Process, is a general principle which is as 
applicable today as it was when Adams was writing. 
Because of the significantly increased power and 
speed of computers in the intervening time, most of 
the fault classes which Adams used have become, in 
principle, detectable with standard pre-release 
testing. Adams stopped with his “most infrequently 
manifesting” class at a 5,000-year, or 7,900-year mark. 
This would be no longer appropriate today. The values 
that Adams chose were arbitrary cut-offs which he 
used to summarise his data. It is now reasonable to 
assume that the “left tail” of the distribution of fault 
sizes extends even further to the left than Adams’ cut-
off points. If Adams were to be writing today, the 
“window” of fault classes would simply have shifted to 
more-infrequent faults. 
Discussion of the relevance for the legal 
profession  
We consider the general conclusions that can be 
drawn from these empirical and experimental results. 
In particular, we contemplate what they tell us about 
the appropriateness of the LC Presumption. We 
suggest three tropes that lawyers, judges and 
academics writing on evidence may wish to keep in 
mind when constructing and judging arguments 
concerning the dependability of software. 
Consider the statement of the Law Commission at 
13.23: “We are satisfied that the assumption of proper 
functioning would apply to computers…” 
This seems to us to come close to asserting that it 
should be assumed that a software fault is not the 
cause when some untoward event has occurred, 
unless there is overt evidence of such a fault. Clearly 
such an assertion could not be supported when the 
software in question has been shown to be unreliable. 
But what about the case when the software is 
demonstrably reliable, as shown, for example, by 
empirical evidence such as extensive failure-free 
working? Here, the lesson from the Adams data 
(discussed above), and others, is that even software 
like this may have – indeed is likely to have – latent 
faults (probably very small ones) that will eventually 
show themselves as failures during operation. (As well 
as latent faults that will not so show themselves.) In 
the absence of evidence to the contrary, therefore, it 
would be unreasonable to assume that in a particular 
instance software is innocent of causing failure. Thus: 
(1) A presumption that any particular computer 
system failure is not caused by software is not 
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justified, even for software that has previously been 
shown to be very reliable. 
The text of 13.23 goes on to provide a “let out” for the 
defence from the assumption of proper functioning of 
software. Essentially this states that the defence 
should not necessarily fail if it had not been in a 
position to find evidence of malfunction on the part of 
the software (and thus had, presumably, not found 
such evidence). This appears to allow the introduction 
of indirect evidence – i.e., short of direct evidence of 
malfunction in the particular instance under trial. 
We provide a couple of examples of the kind of 
indirect evidence that might be appropriate. 
An obvious example would be evidence that the 
software had previously “failed similarly”, so that one 
might infer this may have happened in this instance, 
even though there was no direct evidence for this. 
For a second example, consider a case in which there 
is agreement that some untoward event is caused 
either by software, or by a human operator. If there 
have been failures in the past where it has been 
agreed which of these was the cause, then the failure 
process is a super-position of two independent 
Poisson processes: one of computer failures and one 
of human failures. (The overall human + software 
failure process can also be shown to be a Poisson 
process.) Rigorous statistical arguments can then be 
used to claim how likely it is that, in this particular 
instance, the responsibility lay with the computer 
rather than the human. Again, a situation like this 
would seem to undermine the “proper functioning” 
presumption of 12.23. Thus: 
2) Evidence of previous computer failure undermines 
a presumption of current proper functioning. 
How should we consider a case where there has been 
no evidence of occurrence of a software failure that 
masquerades as a human failure (for example, the 
“phantom transactions” considered by Fraser J)? Can 
or should it be concluded that such a failure cannot 
occur? 
It is well known amongst software engineers that 
software can fail in ways that have not been seen 
before. Most obviously, a new fault manifests itself for 
the first time, and the consequences – the nature of 
the failure – are different from those that have been 
seen in previous failures. The Adams data show that 
there can be many such latent faults. 
More formally, consider a possible class of faults that 
has not been seen to manifest itself yet; for example, 
human-masquerading faults as considered in the 
example above. If we assume that all faults manifest 
themselves as Poisson processes, then it can be shown 
that any subclass of such faults will also occur in a 
Poisson process. So how confident should we be that 
we shall not see a manifestation of a human-
masquerading fault in the future, if we have not seen 
one in the past? This problem was addressed in some 
detail in a paper by one of the authors and his 
colleague.53 The informal answer is that we cannot be 
very confident: for example, if we have seen the 
system in operation for x hours without failure there is 
only about a 50:50 chance that it will survive a further 
x hours before failing. This means that if a particular 
class of faults has not shown itself even in massive 
testing, our confidence in it not manifesting in 
operation can only be rather modest. 
It follows that: 
(3) The fact that a class of failures has not happened 
before is not a reason for assuming it cannot occur. 
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36(11): 69-80, 1993. 
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